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Abstract
Restrictions are commonly placed on the permitted uses
of network protocols in the interests of security. These re-
strictions can sometimes be difficult to enforce. As an ex-
ample, a permitted protocol can be used as a carrier for
another protocol not otherwise permitted. However, if the
observable behaviour of the protocol exhibits differences
between permitted and non-permitted uses, it is possible to
detect inappropriate use.
We consider SSH, the Secure Shell protocol. This is an
encrypted protocol with several uses. We attempt firstly to
classify SSH sessions according to some different types of
traffic for which the sessions have been used, and secondly,
given a policy that permits SSH use for interactive traffic, to
identify when a session appears to have been used for some
other purpose.
1 Introduction
Many modern organisations provide employees with ac-
cess to the Internet and other networks to enable them to
perform their jobs. However, it is important to ensure that
this access is being used appropriately and in compliance
with organisational policy. For example, policies can be
stated in terms of restrictions on Web access or the types
of protocols that employees can use. However, per-
mitted protocols can have uses which are undesirable, and
it can be difficult to prevent or even detect instances of in-
appropriate use with current network security tools such as
firewalls and intrusion detection systems. Controlling the
use of encrypted network protocols is also problematic.
Modern firewalls can be very good at blocking network
traffic based on low-level criteria such as source address and
destination port, and can be very useful in protecting net-
works of machines from inappropriate or unnecessary out-
side access. However, firewalls that perform only this sort
of simple stateful inspection cannot check that the traffic
being passed conforms to the specification of the desired
protocol. Firewalls providing some form of “deep inspec-
tion” [25] are capable of detecting a limited set of known at-
tacks and protocol anomalies in certain common protocols.
Proxies (such as are found in proxy firewalls) can check
conformance to protocol specifications to a greater extent
than deep inspection stateful packet filtering firewalls. No
type of firewall provides the higher-level protocol under-
standing that can enable the detection of malicious usage
of the protocol — a conversation which complies with the
specifications, does not attempt to exploit a vulnerability
such as a buffer overflow vulnerability but which does not
otherwise closely resemble “normal” traffic. Tools such as
httptunnel [4] exist to facilitate tunneling arbitrary net-
work traffic through an HTTP proxy, for example.
Neither firewalls nor proxies handle encrypted traffic
well, having no access to the data protected by encryption.
Encrypted data cannot easily be scanned for malicious con-
tents such as viruses or spyware until it reaches the end
system and is decrypted. Outgoing encrypted data cannot
easily be scanned for content such as proprietary corporate
information being inappropriately released. It is difficult to
ensure even that the underlying protocol being used is ap-
propriate. For example, SSL may be permitted in order to
allow secure access to websites, with an expectation that
the protocol being protected is HTTP. However, SSL may
be used in conjunction with other protocols, and it may be
difficult to distinguish desired uses from unwanted and in-
appropriate ones.
In some cases, it is not reasonable to block all encrypted
protocols — SSL is required for secure website access, and
SSH (Secure Shell protocol) may be required by some users
for remote access to computing resources, for example.
In this paper we will be looking at the identification of
different types of uses of SSH using only the information
that is available for inspection after the data has been en-
crypted: the packet size and inter-arrival time. We assume
that the primary desirable use of SSH is the provision of
secure remote terminal access. Implementations of the pro-
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tocol commonly have many additional features with sub-
stantial potentially legitimate uses. However, these features
can also enable users to bypass organisational security poli-
cies (for example, port forwarding features can be used to
browse inappropriate Web sites during the working day, if
the site terminating the SSH tunnel has a more permissive
general Internet access policy than the client site) and in
some environments it may be considered appropriate to at-
tempt to detect such activity. Our intention is to be able to
provide assistance in auditing compliance with relevant or-
ganisational policies. We are not just looking at tunneled
traffic: we are also interested in identifying usage of fea-
tures such as X11 forwarding, use of which may be dis-
couraged due to security concerns.
We have some success classifying SSH sessions accord-
ing to the type of traffic being carried in the session; for
the main classes of traffic being examined we can assign
the traffic to classes with low false positive and false neg-
ative rates but with significant “don’t know” rates, where a
connection is not assigned to an appropriate class. How-
ever, the classification process does not perform as well for
some of the minor classes of traffic studied, for which we
did not collect many samples. We are more successful at
differentiating interactive traffic from other types of traffic,
with false positive and false negative rates of around 3%. In
the absence of an active attacker, we believe it is possible to
identify types of activity other than simple interactive use
of SSH with a high degree of confidence.
In Section 2 we look at related work, Section 3 provides
a brief overview of some of the relevant capabilities of SSH
implementations, in particular the OpenSSH [22] imple-
mentation of the protocol. Section 4 discusses our analysis
of SSH traffic. In Section 5 we discuss experiments, data
processing and results. We discuss ways in which detec-
tion could be evaded in Section 6. Finally, we conclude in
Section 7.
2 Related Work
Traffic classification has emerged as an important area,
now that the port over which traffic flows is no longer suf-
ficient to determine what the actual protocol of the traffic
is. This has been identified as a problem in the identifica-
tion of peer-to-peer traffic by Karagiannis et al. [17], who
develop a method of identifying P2P activity based on the
patterns of interconnection between network peers. Non-
payload based methods of traffic classification can be of
particular interest, owing to privacy concerns that can arise
over access to the full traffic payload.
Work in the area of traffic classification has used a va-
riety of machine learning techniques, including decision
trees [8] and hidden Markov models [31, 32]. Wright et
al. [31, 32] consider a general traffic classification problem,
for which SSH is one type of traffic being classified. Some
interesting results are reported, but they do not look at at-
tempting to identify different types of tunneled SSH traffic,
or detection of the use of SSH features such as X11 for-
warding.
Song et al. [28] have reported on an attack against SSH
that uses keystroke timings as reflected in SSH packet inter-
arrival times to substantially reduce the amount of work that
needs to be done when cracking passwords.
We are not aware of other work that addresses the use of
SSH specifically.
Tunneling has been proposed and implemented over
many different protocols, including ICMP [6], Do-
main Name System (DNS) request and replies [16] and
HTTP. An example of an HTTP tunneling package is
httptunnel [4].
Measures to detect and filter tunneling through ICMP
have been proposed [27, 26]. We are not aware of any work
having been done on the detection of tunneling using DNS
messages. Some work has been done on detecting tunnel-
ing using HTTP requests and responses. Pack et al. [24, 23]
describe their work on detecting HTTP tunneling using be-
haviour profiles consisting of features such as the number
of packets, the ratio of large and small packets and the total
amount of data received. Unfortunately, it is difficult to say
how effective this system is as there is no way presented to
determine what attacks might be missed.
Mudge [19] has proposed detecting tunneling by deter-
mining what “normal” HTTP traffic looks like, and gen-
erating some simple measures, such as length of session or
amount of data transferred, to use in detecting abnormal ses-
sions. This paper does not discuss an implementation of a
system to detect misuse of HTTP. Borders and Prakash [3]
describe the results obtained from implementing a system
to detect intruder reverse tunnels and communications back
to home base of adware and spyware using a range of mea-
sures taken from “normal” HTTP traffic. Rather than fo-
cusing on packet level statistics, measures included header
formatting, inter-request arrival time, request regularity and
request size, among others. These are higher-level mea-
surements than those used by Pack et al. The system was
successful at detecting tunneling activity, including the ac-
tivity of a tunneling program custom-designed by the au-
thors. Bissias et al. [2] have had some success identifying
the source of SSL-protected HTTP traffic using profiles of
statistical characteristics of Web requests to sites of interest.
Covert channels have been extensively reported as an un-
desired feature of multi-level security operating system im-
plementations that can be used to violate the security pol-
icy of these systems by enabling information to pass from
a high security level to a lower one. [21, 1]. Guidelines re-
quired the minimisation of the bandwidth available through
these channels [21].
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Covert channels exist in modern network protocols as
well [12]. For example, a method of embedding information
using the TCP timestamp option has been proposed [11].
Murdoch and Lewis [20] review many of the proposals for
embedding covert channels into TCP and IP, and propose a
method of embedding data into TCP sequence numbers and
IP identification fields that respects the statistical properties
of these fields as generated by Linux and OpenBSD. Lucena
et al. [18] examine IPv6 for opportunities for embedding
covert channels. “Active wardens” have been proposed and
to some extent implemented to clean network protocols of
covert channels [9]. Firewall proxies can be helpful at re-
moving covert channels from low-level network protocols,
as these systems typically do not pass IP packets or TCP
segments directly from one side of the firewall to the other.
3 SSH Capabilities
SSH is used by many as a secure replacement for remote
access methods such as telnet and rlogin. Unlike
these protocols, SSH provides facilities to validate the iden-
tity of the remote host in order to reduce the possibility of
a man-in-the-middle attack, and encrypts and authenticates
all SSH traffic during the session, protecting against net-
work snooping attacks. In contrast, telnet and rlogin
are plaintext protocols that have no security features beyond
verifying a user password. However, implementations of
SSH commonly have many additional features whose use is
not appropriate in all environments. In this paper, we work
with OpenSSH [22], principally late releases of version 3.
• X11 forwarding. When accessing a remote host,
OpenSSH has the ability to tunnel the X11 protocol
messages through the SSH connection, protecting the
X11 traffic from inspection by an attacker. Unfortu-
nately, if the administrators of the remote machine are
not fully trusted, or it has been compromised, X11 for-
warding may1 allow anyone with access to the user’s
.Xauthority file to access other X windows open
on the user’s desktop. As an example, xkey [10] al-
lows an attacker on the remote machine to snoop on
key presses made in other windows on the user’s desk-
top which are not related to the SSH session [13].
• File transfer, using either scp or sftp. This can be
used to export corporate information, or to import ar-
bitrary data, including malicious software which then
can only be detected by antivirus software running on
the user’s machine.
1In recent versions of OpenSSH, this may require “trusted X11” for-
warding to be enabled. Some X11 clients do not work properly without
trusted X11 forwarding enabled, so it seems likely that trusted X11 for-
warding could be expected to be enabled if X11 forwarding is enabled at
all.
• Dynamic port forwarding causes SSH to behave as a
SOCKS4 or SOCKS5 proxy. Connections to a spec-
ified local port are tunneled through the SSH con-
nection to an arbitrary (dynamic) destination host and
port. Many applications have built-in SOCKS support,
which makes this technique very powerful. It works
very well for performing Web browsing, which is the
common use for this type of forwarding in the experi-
ments performed in this paper.
• Static local port forwarding allows connections to lo-
cal ports to be tunneled through the SSH connection to
a designated remote host and port. It is very similar to
dynamic port forwarding, except that the final destina-
tion for the forwarded traffic is fixed. Some protocols
cannot be used effectively with static port forwarding.
Other relevant capabilities which we have not investi-
gated in detail include remote static port forwarding and
(new in version 4) support for establishing full VPNs using
an SSH tunnel.
OpenSSH also provides the ability to compress data be-
fore forwarding it through the tunnel, which can be very
useful for reducing the amount of network traffic required,
particularly for slow networks. It does mean that it is neces-
sary to consider both compressed and uncompressed forms
of different types of traffic when attempting to build a useful
classification system.
ACSI 33 [7], an information security policy guide pub-
lished by Australia’s Defence Signals Directorate, includes
guidance on the recommended configuration of SSH for
Australian government agencies. In particular, it is recom-
mended to disable connection forwarding and X11 forward-
ing. However, not all servers located at other organisations
with different security policies to which a user might con-
nect will necessarily have these features disabled, and en-
forcing the restrictions from the client side of the connec-
tion may be impractical.
We identify SSH’s interactive capabilities as its primary
desirable feature. We aim to detect non-interactive use and
possibly even identify use of X11 forwarding, file transfer
and different types of port forwarding, so that some form of
limited audit capability could be implemented for compli-
ance with high-level policies on the use of SSH.
4 Analysis of SSH traffic
Our analysis of SSH traffic is based on collecting statisti-
cal distributions for SSH traffic in which particular types of
activity are conducted, and using these distributions to clas-
sify unknown connections using an instance-based learn-
ing approach. Our hypothesis is that data such as packet
sizes will reveal information about the activity that is being
conducted during the SSH session. We represent an SSH
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connection with a probability distribution (normalised fre-
quency of packet sizes) and use multiple samples of a par-
ticular type of traffic (for example, file transfer) to define a
class of connections.
A “connection” can be described by a 4-tuple consisting
of source and destination IP and source and destination port.
We do not use timeouts to separate connections with the
same 4-tuple from each other, because the protocol which
we are studying uses TCP for data transport. A TCP con-
nection can be left idle without timing out, and use can then
be resumed without difficulty. The packets that are used to
initiate a TCP connection have the TCP SYN flag set; we
use packets with the SYN flag set and corresponding to the
same 4-tuple to separate connections from each other.
The size of packets in the SSH connection provides only
a general indication of the amount of actual application data
being carried. This is because of the cryptographic protec-
tion mechanisms: block ciphers process data in chunks of
a particular size (AES, for example, has a block size of
16 bytes), and integrity protection can result in message
authentication codes of 10 bytes or more being attached.
Small amounts of extra padding can also be added. A sin-
gle keypress in an interactive SSH session can result in an
SSH packet of around 50 bytes. In some cases, compres-
sion prior to encryption will remove redundancy from the
plaintext and result in smaller packets observed than would
otherwise be the case.
We divide a connection into two halves, the part of the
connection in which data flows from client to server, and
the part in which data flows from server to client. Statistics
are computed separately for each.
We evaluate how well the classification process works
using cross-validation [30] and confusion matrices. Cross-
validation is a standard technique for evaluating machine
learning algorithms. In this case, we use 10-fold cross-
validation. We implement cross-validation by randomly
partitioning the data set into 10 partitions. One partition
is used as test data, the other nine as training data for classi-
fying the test samples. Each partition is used as test data in
turn, and the results of the classification are used to form a
confusion matrix. The rows of the confusion matrix repre-
sents the actual class of an item, and the columns the classes
to which the classification algorithm assigns the item. Con-
fusion matrices show how readily different classes of items
are distinguished from each other by the classification algo-
rithm. Small variations are possible in the results of cross-
validation due to different random partitions of the data set.
4.1 Algorithm description
The classification algorithm can be described as follows:
• Load connection packet size probability distributions
and other statistics for connections of known classifi-
cation.
• Generate statistics for connection of unknown classifi-
cation.
• Measure the “distance” between the statistics of the
unknown connection and each known connection.
• Sort the scores in order of closeness.
• The unknown connection is assigned to the same class
as the majority verdict (3 or more) of the closest five
connections.
4.2 Frequency distributions
The maximum size of packets will vary depending on
the physical network medium used to transmit the pack-
ets. Our experiments were conducted on Ethernet networks,
and for this medium the largest packet size is 1500 bytes.
This quantity is otherwise known as the Maximum Transfer
Unit (MTU). However, we use only the amount of user data
present in each TCP segment for generating the frequency
distributions. We do not count the IP or TCP headers. The
amount of user data that is present in packets is further con-
strained by the TCP Maximum Segment Size (MSS) for
each part of the connection. The network MTU affects the
MSS setting, but it is also affected by the presence of fire-
wall equipment in the network, which can adjust the MSS
of connections. We chose a maximum for our packet size
range of 1300 bytes; larger packets would be assigned to the
same bin as a packet of 1300 bytes.
We did not count packets with no user data, such as TCP
acknowledgment-only packets.
We assigned each data point to one of 30 bins. Too few
bins do not bring out the features of each distribution suffi-
ciently. Too many bins will be oversensitive to minor vari-
ations in the traffic. 30 bins was considered to approximate
a distribution with a bin size of 1 (the extreme) reasonably
well. The bins were of integral size; leftovers were dis-
tributed evenly across the bins, so that all bins are very sim-
ilar in size.
After computing the packet size frequencies, the distri-
bution was normalised to form a probability distribution
which could be used with some selected distance measures.
4.3 Distance measures
There are many distance measures which can be used
to compare the closeness of two probability distributions,
including the variational distance, harmonic mean and
Kullback-Liebler divergence. We used the Jensen-Shannon
divergence [5] (a form of the Kullback-Liebler divergence)
and the Bhattacharyya distance [15].
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In both equations P and Q represent the two probability
distributions being compared. P might represent a distribu-
tion of known classification, Q a distribution of unknown
classification. However, as these measures are symmetric,
which is known and which is unknown is not important.
Both measures are easily calculated, the Bhattacharyya
distance being somewhat simpler to compute than the
Jensen-Shannon divergence. Results closer to zero indicate
better matches for each measure. The Bhattacharyya dis-
tance has been used with machine learning approaches [5]
and has been used with success for signal selection [15],
for example. The Jensen-Shannon measure is symmetric,
unlike the Kullback-Liebler divergence itself, and was cho-
sen as a representative of the divergence-type measures that
were described as a form of the Kullback-Liebler diver-
gence.
Since we separate a single connection into client- and
server-sourced parts, we will have two distance measure
calculations, one for each distribution, forming a score vec-
tor. The final score for any two distributions being com-
pared is the magnitude of the score vector. This allows ad-
ditional measures to be easily used if desired.
4.4 Additional statistics
In addition to the probability distribution distance mea-
sures we can compute, there are many other possible statis-
tics that may be used to shed some light on the type of ac-
tivity occurring during an SSH session. We compute the
following additional statistics:
• Bytes per second for packets with an inter-arrival time
of less than 2 seconds. This statistic captures informa-
tion on the amount of data transferred during the times
when the connection is active, so periods of time when
the connection is idle do not influence the generation
of the statistic. The statistic is computed by totaling
the packet sizes and dividing by the sum of the inter-
arrival times, for packets with inter-arrival times less
than 2 seconds.





3Note that we used logarithms to the base 2 in calculating the Jensen-
Shannon divergence.
• Packets per second for packets with an inter-arrival
time of less than 2 seconds. This statistic is computed
in the same manner as that of bytes per second.
• Bytes per packet.
• We define a “chain” as a sequence of packets of the
same size at least 5 packets in length, and use this to
calculate two statistics:
– The packet size whose chains account for the
largest number of packets in the connection.
– The packet size that accounts for the largest num-
ber of chains.
The idea behind these statistics is that an interactive
connection will consist of a large number of packets of
a very similar size.
Typically when using these statistics for classification
the logarithm of the value rather than the value itself will be
used. Bytes per second, for example, exhibits a wide range
of values. Using a logarithm of the value reduces the range
of variation and minimizes the effect that a statistic has on
the other statistics being used in the classification so that the
effect is not overwhelming. In the case of bytes per second
we also impose a threshold on the value of four kilobytes
per second — anything larger is treated as 4kB/second. This




The data collected constitutes full header and partial pay-
load information on a subset of the principal author’s SSH
sessions from late 2005 to May, 2006. This constitutes over
400 sessions and 11.5 million packets. All except some file
transfer sessions (which appears not to be truly interactive,
not even when using sftp) were operated manually. Net-
work traffic was captured using tcpdump, running on ei-
ther the source or sink of the traffic. Care was taken that
packets were not double-counted. Capturing traffic at a
point intermediate to the SSH client and server would have
been preferred, but this option was not available for these
experiments.
Most of the traffic captured comprised interactive, X11,
file transfer and Web browsing sessions tunneled through
an SSH connection. Small amounts of USENET news traf-
fic (NNTP) and Samba SMB/CIFS file sharing traffic were
captured4. Finally, a number of graphical sessions using
4Tunneling Samba traffic through SSH required the aid of a transparent
SOCKS proxy redirector and local firewall support to redirect the traffic to
the proxy.
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NoMachine’s NX X11 compression technology were cap-
tured between a NoMachine NX client and a FreeNX server.
We provide further information on the main categories of
monitored sessions:
• Interactive sessions consisted of a variety of activ-
ities, including mail reading and editing, program-
ming, system administration tasks and other command
shell work. In many sessions extensive use was made
of screen, a terminal multiplexer that allows many
command line shells to be executed simultaneously
within a single login session. The size of the window
will affect the size of response packets from the server
where screen refreshes are required, so windows of a
variety of sizes were used.
• X11 applications used in these sessions included
xterm, synaptic, Acrobat Reader, OpenOffice,
xdvi and ImageMagick.
• Web browsing included access to daily news sites, cor-
porate sites, sites with programming and development
information and a variety of other sites of personal
and professional interest to the principal author. Only
small files such as PDFs or certain source code pack-
ages were downloaded during these monitored Web
browsing sessions. Web browsing used Mozilla, Sa-
fari and Firefox.
• File transfer was principally composed of small files
(on the order of several megabytes in size) or groups
of such files. File transfers were performed in both
directions; that is, files were transferred both to and
from the file transfer client.
It should be noted that as far as possible, sessions were
“pure”: a session used for HTTP tunneling would be used
only for HTTP tunneling, not interactive traffic as well (it
would be possible in practice to do both, however).
NX was of interest because it is claimed that this tech-
nology can make X11 sessions useful even over network
links with very restricted bandwidth capabilities, and it was
thought that for some types of activities such a session
might more closely resemble an interactive session than
other types of graphical session. In Section 3, we identified
security concerns with the use of X11 forwarding through
SSH. In some brief experiments with NX X11 sessions, we
were unsuccessful in using the X11 xkey exploit previously
discussed to snoop on other X windows unrelated to the NX
session; it only appeared to allow snooping on other X win-
dows open in the NX session, a much less significant prob-
lem than for ordinary X11 forwarding but still possibly of
concern.
A variety of machines were involved, all older than
3 years running some version of Linux or Mac OS X.
OpenSSH clients and servers were all using protocol 2. No
special effort was made to tune the clients and servers, with
the exception that one client was adjusted to prefer a MAC
(Message Authentication Code, used for data integrity pro-
tection) based on SHA1 instead of MD5, and in order to
prevent firewall timeouts disconnecting idle sessions keep-
alive messages were enabled to some destinations.
Sessions were established between computers over sev-
eral different types of network connection:
• university computers and researcher’s home (ADSL
512/128);
• university computers and computer of ISP offering
SSH access;
• two university computers, mostly on the same network
subnet;
• two home computers, on the same subnet.
Where possible, traffic was generated with and without
SSH session compression enabled.
The SSH traffic involved with X11 forwarding, NoMa-
chine NX and Samba was restricted to local network activ-
ity — we did not have cause to employ these protocols over
a wide-area network such as the Internet.
One challenge in work of this nature is identifying the
nature of the training sample. Is this an interactive ses-
sion? Or does the data represent a tunneled Web browsing
session? In some areas, such as the identification of P2P
connections [17], it is possible to validate a non-payload
based protocol identification technique by using an alterna-
tive payload-based method. However, this is not an option
in this case.
So a wrapper script, written in Python, was installed
on those machines used to initiate SSH connections. This
wrapper script would log the command and start time of an
SSH session in an SQLite [14] database. On command exit,
an opportunity would be presented to the user to add a short
description of the completed session, which would also be
logged to the database. This information could be used later
in classifying a session into one of several different classes.
5.2 Data Processing
Useful information such as the source and destination
addresses and ports, TCP flags and sequence numbers was
extracted from the headers of captured packets and logged
to an SQLite database. Connections were identified by
searching for the SYN-flagged packets that identified the
start of each TCP session, and information on the session,
including its start and end time, and a unique 48-bit iden-
tifier based on a hash of the connection start time, source
and destination addresses and ports, would be entered into
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Q NX graphical session
S Tunneled Samba
Table 1. Traffic class labels
the database. Connections were manually classified into an
appropriate class using stored information on the command
executed and user-supplied comments. Statistical informa-
tion was calculated for every classified connection. All this
information was stored in the SQLite database for later use.
When generating the statistics for each connection, we
use only packets that have arrived in sequence. The se-
quence can be disturbed by packets reordered in the net-
work, packets retransmitted (and possibly combined with
other packets, rather than the original packet alone being
retransmitted) or packets dropped by the traffic capture pro-
gram. We implement some simple code to follow the TCP
sequence numbers for each connection.
5.3 Results
We use 10-fold cross-validation to generate confusion
matrices to evaluate the performance of the classification.
In the figures and tables that follow, the different types of
traffic are labeled as described in Table 1.
Figures 1, 2, 3 show sample cumulative probability dis-
tributions for traffic through an SSH tunnel representing
interactive, Web browsing and compressed Web browsing
traffic respectively. In each figure, the graph on the left rep-
resents traffic sent by the client to the server, and the graph
on the right represents traffic sent by the server to the client.
Each line represents a cumulative probability (frequency)
distribution of sizes of packets from a single connection,
split into a client half and a server half. At any point, the
graphs reflect the proportion of packets from the connection
that were of a particular size or smaller.
As can be seen, these distributions are quite distinct.
However, the same could not be said for all of the distri-
butions.
Tables 2 and 3 show confusion matrices using just the
Bhattacharyya and Jensen-Shannon measures to classify
connections into a particular class. ‘XX’ denotes the un-
known class, indicating that no majority verdict could be
reached. Recall that rows are known classes, columns indi-
cate predicted class and the final column indicates the num-
ber of instances available for classification. Matrix entries
are % of total number of connections of each type.
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Figure 1. Cumulative probability distribution
for class ‘I’, interactive SSH traffic.
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Figure 2. Cumulative probability distribu-
tion for class ‘H’, Web browsing forwarded
through an SSH tunnel.
F H I IX N Q S XX Count
F 93.86 0.00 0.88 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.26 114
H 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 49
I 0.00 0.00 96.48 0.88 0.00 0.88 0.00 1.76 227
IX 0.00 1.52 6.06 90.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.52 66
N 12.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 37.50 0.00 0.00 50.00 8
Q 0.00 0.00 44.44 11.11 0.00 44.44 0.00 0.00 9
S 14.29 0.00 28.57 28.57 7.14 0.00 14.29 7.14 14
Table 2. Confusion Matrix: Bhattacharyya
F H I IX N Q S XX Count
F 93.86 0.88 0.00 0.00 1.75 0.00 0.00 3.51 114
H 2.04 97.96 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 49
I 0.00 0.00 96.48 1.32 0.00 1.32 0.00 0.88 227
IX 1.52 1.52 6.06 87.88 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.03 66
N 37.50 12.50 0.00 0.00 12.50 0.00 0.00 37.50 8
Q 0.00 0.00 55.56 11.11 0.00 33.33 0.00 0.00 9
S 14.29 0.00 28.57 28.57 7.14 0.00 14.29 7.14 14
Table 3. Confusion Matrix: Jensen-Shannon
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Figure 3. Cumulative probability distribution
for class ‘H’ compressed, Web browsing for-
warded through an SSH tunnel where SSH is
performing compression prior to encrypting
the tunneled data.
F H I IX N Q S XX Count
F 74.56 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 25.44 114
H 0.00 85.71 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 14.29 49
I 0.00 0.00 89.43 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.00 10.13 227
IX 0.00 0.00 0.00 74.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 25.76 66
N 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 12.50 0.00 0.00 87.50 8
Q 0.00 0.00 22.22 0.00 0.00 44.44 0.00 33.33 9
S 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 14.29 85.71 14
Table 4. Confusion Matrix: Bhattacharyya +
avg. bytes/sec + threshold=0.09
As can be seen, both measures do a reasonable job of
separating the four classes with the largest number of con-
nections, but neither does particularly well for the three
classes with only a few connections. We can improve
the class separation by introducing the bytes per second
measure previously described, to add an indication of how
much data was transferred during each session, and a sim-
ple threshold on the final composite score, to capture the
idea of another distribution needing to be “close enough”
before being considered to be a good match. This is likely
to be especially important when attempting to classify con-
nections involving a protocol for which no training samples
had previously been collected. Table 4 shows the results
of the classification for this combination, using a threshold
value of 0.09 (threshold value determined by experiment).
Quite a few connections are now classified as “un-
known”, but class separation is otherwise much improved.
This could be useful in detecting certain types of non-
permitted uses of SSH. For example, 85% of tunneled
HTTP connections were successfully classified, with no
false positives. So where this type of SSH usage is not per-
F H I IX N Q S XX Count
F 79.82 0.88 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 19.30 114
H 0.00 87.76 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 12.24 49
I 0.00 0.00 90.75 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.00 8.81 227
IX 1.52 0.00 1.52 72.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 24.24 66
N 0.00 12.50 0.00 0.00 50.00 0.00 0.00 37.50 8
Q 0.00 0.00 22.22 0.00 0.00 44.44 0.00 33.33 9
S 7.14 0.00 0.00 7.14 0.00 0.00 35.71 50.00 14
Table 5. Confusion Matrix: Jensen-Shannon
+ avg. bytes/sec + threshold=0.015
I XX Count
I 96.48 3.52 227
XX 5.00 95.00 260
Table 6. Confusion Matrix: Bhattacharyya
mitted by policy, a reasonable level of confidence could be
had in this identification. Class separation when using the
Jensen-Shannon method can be improved as well, but not
as substantially as is the case when using the Bhattacharyya
method, as Table 5 indicates.
We now consider how compliance with a policy that
specifies that SSH is to be used in an interactive manner
only might be audited. In this case, interest is not so much
in what particular sort of activity is being conducted, but
in whether the session represents interactive SSH or some-
thing else. Table 6 displays the results of using only the
Bhattacharyya measure to classify connections into classes
“interactive” and “everything else”. Classifications have a
reasonably low level of false positives and false negatives,
which can be improved by including more of the statistical
measures previously described in the classification process.
Table 7 displays the results of this classification process. It
can be seen that both the false positive and false negative
rates have been improved.
6 Evasion
The distribution of packet sizes from an SSH connection
is an important part of the classification performed here. It
would be possible to affect the results by altering this distri-
I XX Count
I 97.80 2.20 227
XX 1.92 98.08 260
Table 7. Confusion Matrix: Bhattacharyya
+ maxpacketsize + modepacketsize + avg.
bytes/sec + threshold=0.9
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bution of packet sizes. Simple methods by which this could
be attempted include reducing the MTU of the network in-
terface through which outgoing SSH traffic is sent and com-
piling a modified SSH binary which adjusts the TCP max-
imum segment size using the TCP MAXSEG socket op-
tion [29, p. 219]. Changing the MTU reduces the max-
imum packet size that can be sent over the interface, not
just of SSH traffic but for all traffic and also affects the size
of packets sent in both directions on the connection. The
TCP MAXSEG option affects only the particular connec-
tion to which it is applied.
Reducing the size of the largest chunk of data that can
be sent in a single TCP segment will change the packet size
distribution for uses of SSH in which there are many larger
packets (such as file transfer and HTTP(S) forwarding).
Significantly changing the size of the largest packet that
can be sent or received will certainly affect the ability to
classify traffic as representing a particular type of usage.
However, the classification of traffic as representing an in-
teractive SSH session or some other type of SSH session
would be less affected: Figure 1 illustrates that both halves
of an interactive SSH connections are principally composed
of small packets. Sessions that have a higher proportion of
larger packets, such as HTTP(S) and file transfer sessions,
would not easily be confused with interactive SSH, even
when limiting the maximum packet size (by changing the
MTU, for example). The use of additional statistical mea-
sures may need to be applied. For example, greater inter-
vention would be required to spread the data transferred out
over a longer period of time in order to preserve the bytes
per second, packets per second and bytes per packet. For
the client to server part of the connection, 92% of interac-
tive sessions in the test data collected satisfy conditions of
average bytes per second less than 300, average packets per
second less than 6 and average bytes per packet less than
70. Only 8% of forwarded Web browsing sessions satisfy
the same requirements. However, a sufficiently motivated
and patient adversary with the necessary control over both
the SSH client and server would be able to evade detection.
An adversary that combines several different types of us-
age in the one SSH session would also be able to frustrate
classification of the session as one particular type of traffic,
but without any guarantees of what sort of traffic the session
would be classified as instead.
Practical deployment of systems that detect anomalies in
the operation of some system or the use of some protocol
can be challenging. It is difficult to collect training data
which is “clean”, that is, which does not contain any at-
tacks. This problem would be familiar to researchers work-
ing with some types of intrusion detection systems. In our
case, some generic behaviour profiles could be provided. If
local customisation is required to improve detection perfor-
mance or provide detection for obscure uses, trusted staff
(perhaps including IT staff and others from the wider user
population) who had occasion to work with SSH could be
enlisted to help create clean data that could be used to detect
anomalies.
7 Conclusion
Tunneling one network protocol through another is one
way that attackers or malicious insiders can communicate
through firewalls or other traffic control and monitoring de-
vices. Furthermore, some network protocols such as SSH
have multiple uses, some of which may be desirable, oth-
ers which are prohibited by security policies. By monitor-
ing network traffic, it may be possible to determine what
types of activity is taking place, and so provide a simple
audit capability for compliance with security policies. We
describe work to separate SSH connections into different
classes, using some simple statistical calculations and com-
parisons. We found that using these methods, it is possible
to identify different types of SSH activity with a reasonable
degree of confidence (greater than 74% for the main four
types of activity examined, with very low false positives).
Furthermore, without identifying what kind of traffic it is,
it is possible to identify types of activity other than simple
interactive use of SSH with a high degree of confidence.
We found that it was possible to obtain a reasonable clas-
sification without attempting to make much use of inter-
arrival times. While we did collect this information, the
manner in which we captured the traffic did not ideally re-
flect the environment in which such captures would be con-
ducted in practice, which would ordinarily be on a gate-
way machine at some intermediate point between the traf-
fic source and sink. It was considered that this did not ad-
versely affect the packet size data, however.
All sessions were based on the activities of a single user.
We have endeavoured to ensure that a reasonable range of
activities were performed during the monitored sessions so
that there could be some expectation that the results would
be reflective of the activities of a wider user population. In
addition to enrolling additional users in a subsequent study,
further work could include use of more sophisticated ma-
chine learning methods to improve the classification, use
of more statistical measures in classification, extension to
other types of tunneled protocols and attempting classifi-
cation based on a sliding window of packets within a ses-
sion, to identify different uses, some perhaps not conform-
ing with policy, within the one SSH session.
References
[1] R. J. Anderson. Security Engineering: A Guide to Building
Dependable Distributed Systems. Wiley, 2001.
Proceedings of the 22nd Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC'06)
0-7695-2716-7/06 $20.00  © 2006
[2] G. D. Bissias, M. Liberatore, D. Jensen, and B. N. Levine.
Privacy vulnerabilities in encrypted HTTP streams. In Pri-
vacy Enhancing Technologies Workshop, May–June 2005.
[3] K. Borders and A. Prakash. Web tap: detecting covert web
traffic. In Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Com-
puter and communications security, pages 110–120, Wash-
ington, DC, 2004.
[4] L. Brinkhoff. GNU httptunnel. http://www.nocrew.
org/software/httptunnel.html. Last checked:
20060529.
[5] S. Chapman. String similarity metrics for information
integration. http://www.dcs.shef.ac.uk/˜sam/
stringmetrics.html. Last checked: 20060529.
[6] daemon9. Project Loki: ICMP tunneling. http://
www.phrack.org/show.php?p=49\&a=6, Novem-
ber 1996.
[7] Department of Defence. Australian Government Infor-
mation and Communications Technology Security Manual
(ACSI 33), March 2006. Available from http://www.
dsd.gov.au/library/infosec/acsi33.html.
[8] J. P. Early, C. E. Brodley, and C. Rosenberg. Behavioral
authentication of server flows. In ACSAC ’03: Proceedings
of the 19th Annual Computer Security Applications Confer-
ence, December 2003.
[9] G. Fisk, M. Fisk, C. Papadopoulos, and J. Neil. Eliminat-
ing steganography in internet traffic with active wardens. In
Information Hiding 2002, volume 2578 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pages 18–35. Springer-Verlag, October
2002.
[10] D. Giampaolo. xkey.c. http://www.phreak.org/
archives/exploits/unix/xwin-exploits/
x11serv.c. Last checked: 20060531.
[11] J. Giffin, R. Greenstadt, P. Litwack, and R. Tibbetts. Covert
messaging through TCP timestamps. In Privacy Enhancing
Technologies, volume 2482 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 194–208. Springer-Verlag, April 2002.
[12] T. G. Handel and I. Maxwell T. Sandford. Hiding data in
the OSI network model. In Proceedings of the First Inter-
national Workshop on Information Hiding, volume 1174 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 23–38. Springer-
Verlag, 1996.
[13] B. Hatch. SSH users beware: The hazards of X11 forward-
ing. http://www.hackinglinuxexposed.com/
articles/20040705.html, 2004. Last checked:
20060531.
[14] D. R. Hipp. SQLite: An embeddable SQL database engine.
http://www.sqlite.org/. Last checked: 20060529.
[15] T. Kailath. The divergence and Bhattacharyya distance mea-
sures in signal selection. IEEE Transactions on Communi-
cations, 15(1):52–60, February 1967.
[16] D. Kaminsky. OzymanDNS. http://www.doxpara.
com/ozymandns_src_0.1.tgz. Last checked:
20060531.
[17] T. Karagiannis, A. Broido, M. Faloutsos, and kc claffy.
Transport layer identification of P2P traffic. In Proceedings
of the 4th ACM SIGCOMM Conference on Internet Mea-
surement (IMC’04), pages 121–134, Taormina, Sicily, Italy,
October 2004.
[18] N. B. Lucena, G. Lewandowski, and S. J. Chapin. Covert
channels in IPv6. In Privacy Enhancing Technologies Work-
shop, May 2005. (Not yet published.).
[19] Mudge. Insider threat: Models and solutions. ;login:,
28(6):29–33, December 2003.
[20] S. J. Murdoch and S. Lewis. Embedding covert channels into
TCP/IP. In Information Hiding: 7th International Work-
shop, volume 3727 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 247–261. Springer Verlag, June 2005.
[21] National Computer Security Center. Department of De-
fense Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria. DoD
5200.28-STD, December 1985. (“Orange Book”).
[22] OpenBSD Project. OpenSSH. http://www.openssh.
org. Last checked: 20060531.
[23] D. J. Pack and B. E. Mullins. A portable microcontroller-
based HTTP tunnelling activity detection system. In Pro-
ceedings of the 2003 IEEE International Conference on Sys-
tems, Man and Cybernetics, volume 2, pages 1544–1549,
October 2003.
[24] D. J. Pack, W. Streilein, S. Webster, and R. Cunningham.
Detecting HTTP tunneling activities. In Proceedings Of The
2002 IEEE Workshop On Information Assurance, 2002.




[26] A. Singh, O. Nordström, C. Lu, and A. L. M. dos Santos.
Malicious ICMP tunneling: Defense against the vulnera-
bility. In Proceedings of ACISP ’03: the 8th Australasian
Conference on Information Security and Privacy, volume
2727 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 226–236.
Springer-Verlag, 2003.
[27] T. Sohn, J. Moon, S. Lee, D. H. Lee, and J. Lim. Covert
channel detection in the ICMP payload using Support Vector
Machine. In Computer and Information Sciences - ISCIS
2003, volume 2869 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 828–835. Springer-Verlag, 2003.
[28] D. X. Song, D. Wagner, and X. Tian. Timing analysis of
keystrokes and timing attacks on SSH. In Proceedings of
the 10th USENIX Security Symposium, Washington, D.C.,
USA, August 2001. USENIX Association.
[29] W. R. Stevens, B. Fenner, and A. M. Rudoff. UNIX Network
Programming: The Sockets Networking API, volume 1.
Addison-Wesley, 3rd edition, 2004.
[30] I. H. Witten and E. Frank. Data mining: practical machine
learning tools and techniques. Morgan Kaufman, 2nd edi-
tion, 2005.
[31] C. Wright, F. Monrose, and G. M. Masson. HMM profiles
for network traffic classification. In Proceedings of the 2004
ACM workshop on Visualization and data mining for com-
puter security, pages 9–15, October 2004.
[32] C. V. Wright, F. Monrose, and G. M. Masson. Towards bet-
ter protocol identification using profile HMMs. Technical
Report JHU-SPAR051201, Johns Hopkins University, 2005.
Proceedings of the 22nd Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC'06)
0-7695-2716-7/06 $20.00  © 2006
